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CIVIL RICO LIABILITY-THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
PSLRA AMENDMENT HAS BROAD
IMPLICATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF
SECURITIES FRAUD CONSPIRACY
Michael Buscher*
N MLSMK Investment Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., the Second
Circuit faced a first-impression issue regarding the specific applicabil-
ity of section 107 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) to private securities fraud claims brought under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' After finding the
amendment's language to be unambiguous, further exploring the amend-
ment's legislative history, and analyzing the opinions of several district
courts dealing with the same issue, the court held that the PSLRA "bars a
plaintiff from asserting a civil RICO claim premised upon ... securities
fraud ... even where the plaintiff [can] not bring a private securities law
claim against the same defendant."'2 While the decision may be consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's general trend in narrowing the scope of
civil RICO claims,3 the court's analysis glossed over the amendment's lin-
guistic ambiguity. More importantly, it clearly deprives securities fraud
victims in a manner inconsistent with the overall goal of the PSLRA
amendment itself.4
In 2008, plaintiff MLSMK Investment Company invested $12.8 million
with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BMIS), the "broker-
dealer business" Bernard L. Madoff owned and operated in order to
carry out his "notorious" Ponzi scheme.5 Included within BMIS was an
initially well-respected, market-making business for which defendant JP
Morgan Chase & Co. (JPMC) was a trading partner.6 Additionally,
BMIS ran an "investment-advisory entity through which the clients [were
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.B.A. & B.S. 2010, Southern Methodist University.
1. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268, 269 (2d Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
3. See David Martinez, What Remains After Anza?, RoBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER &
CIRESI (June 26, 2006), http://www.rkmc.com/Civil-RICO-What-Remains-After-Anza.htm.
4. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 42-44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 727-28.
5. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 270.
6. Id.
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told they] would earn returns of 'up to 10-12% a year." 7 However, the
investment-advisory business was allegedly non-existent; "Madoff never
made [the] investments. Instead, he used later-invested money to pay
'returns' to other investors and to fund his lavish lifestyle .... "s BMIS
held its main bank account at JPMC, who later offered a derivative in-
strument specially designed for Madoff's investments. 9 JPMC's special
product "guaranteed a return of three times the earnings" of the "Sentry
Fund," which was composed of primarily BMIS investments. 10 JPMC
hedged the risk of its product by investing up to $250 million into the
"Madoff-linked Sentry Fund."" Consequently, "'due to the [phony] re-
turns Madoff was showing on the money invested with BMIS,"' the fund
reported a very high yield throughout the financial crisis of 2008, which
raised a few eyebrows at JPMC and later prompted their investigation of
Madoff's business dealings.' 2
After discovering Madoff's fraudulent activity through BMIS, JPMC
removed its investment from the Sentry fund, yet continued its trading
relationship with the BMIS market-making business and continued to
hold the BMIS bank account. 13 MLSMK asserted that "despite [JPMC's]
actual knowledge" of Madoff's fraudulent activity, JPMC continued to
serve BMIS because of the account's high earnings and fees. 14 Addition-
ally, MLSMK pointed out that JPMC avoided its opportunities to protect
other victims of Madoff's scams while liquidating its own investments and
protecting itself.15
In April of 2009, MLSMK sued JPMC in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, claiming, among several other com-
plaints, that by continuing to serve Madoff and BMIS with the knowledge
of their fraudulent activity, JPMC "conspired to violate" the RICO stat-
ute, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).' 6 JPMC subsequently moved to dis-
miss this claim, arguing that Section 107 of the PSLRA barred "any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale
of securities to establish a violation of section 1962.' 17 The District Court
granted JPMC's motion, and MLSMK later appealed the court's
decision. 18
Because federal case law barred MLSMK from bringing an "aiding and
abetting" claim under the Securities Exchange Act, its only hope for a
7. Id.
8. Id.




13. Id. at 272.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 272-73.
17. Id. at 273, 278; see also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2010).
18. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 273.
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private right of action was under RICO. 19 However, JPMC claimed that
the PSLRA ("which was enacted as an amendment to the RICO statute")
barred the use of conduct that "'would have been actionable"' under cur-
rent securities law to establish a violation of Section 1962 of the RICO
statute.20 Consequently, the Second Circuit faced the question of
whether the PSLRA barred all conduct that could be actionable under
securities laws from being a predicate offense under the RICO statute,
even if the plaintiff had no valid alternative claims under securities laws,
or whether the bar only applied where the particular plaintiff in the case
had an "actionable" claim under securities law against the named
defendant. 21
In analyzing the issue of where the bar applied, the court first focused
on the "plain language" of the PSLRA amendment to the RICO statute,
which reads: "no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a vio-
lation of section 1962."22 Agreeing with a few district court opinions, the
Second Circuit found that the language unambiguously bars all RICO
claims based upon any securities fraud conduct, not only those specific
plaintiffs with valid securities fraud claims against particular defend-
ants. 23 Although the court was convinced based on the mere language of
the statute, it explored the legislative history of the PSLRA in order to
further support its holding.24 The court focused primarily on provisions
of the Committee Report which suggested the purpose of the amendment
was to "'remove [as a predicate act of racketeering] any conduct that
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities
as racketeering under civil RICO.' , 25 Additionally, the Senate Report
included provisions which showed that Congress was aware that the
amendment might leave certain securities fraud victims-those claiming
conspiracy or aiding and abetting-without recourse.2 6 Moreover, the
court pointed out that the Senate specifically granted the Securities and
Exchange Commission full authority to bring action against aiding and
abetting violators. 27
The Second Circuit found support in several district court opinions that
MLSMK's proposed interpretation of the RICO Amendment would in-
evitably lead to abuse of RICO's remedies of treble damages. 28 In
Fezanni v. Bear Stearns & Co., the district court held that such a narrow
19. Id. at 274; see also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1993).
20. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 273.
21. Id. at 274.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
23. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 277.
24. Id. at 278-79.
25. Id. at 279 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 746).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 275.
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interpretation would allow plaintiffs to "deliberately plead facts that es-
tablished no more than that a particular defendant aided and abetted an-
other's securities fraud" in order to avoid the PSLRA bar in obtaining
treble damages under RICO. 29 Moreover, in Thomas H. Lee v. Mayer
Brown, another district court held that the idea of allowing those plain-
tiffs claiming aiding and abetting of securities fraud to take advantage of
the RICO statute was almost fraudulent in itself, and thus completely
contrary to Congress's intent in passing the RICO amendment. 30
MLSMK attempted to distinguish itself, however, by showing that the
plaintiffs in these cases "pled fraud and RICO claims in the alternative,
whereas in this case, the plaintiff pleads only a civil RICO claim" without
any alternative route under securities laws. 31 However, the Second Cir-
cuit rejected this argument, concluding that the district court's holdings
"were not limited to concerns about 'gamesmanship' in pleadings. '32
Rather, the court found that these cases were primarily concerned with
the meaning of the statute, "[independent] from the specific facts of the
cases before them. '33 MLSMK also relied on two district court cases that
held the bar did in fact only apply when the specific plaintiff actually had
a valid avenue under securities laws.34 However, the circuit court re-
jected the reasoning of these cases, holding that their interpretation of
the statute was far too narrow to align with Congress's intent. Conse-
quently, because MLSMK based its RICO claim on JPMC's conduct of
conspiring with Madoff and BMIS in their fraudulent securities scheme,
the court held that the amendment did, in fact, bar MLSMK from recov-
ering under RICO, even though they had no alternative right of action
under current securities law. 35
The Second Circuit's decision seems to be consistent with a trend of
judicial narrowing of civil RICO claims across the board. In 1985, the
U.S. Supreme Court noted that private action under RICO was beginning
to evolve "into something quite different from the original conception of
its enactors": originally designed to decrease the activity of "mobsters
and organized criminals," RICO was beginning to become a common
"tool for everyday fraud cases brought against 'respected and legitimate'
enterprises. '36 Courts subsequently began narrowing the scope of the
civil RICO context by increasing the required showing in order to recover
under the statute. 37 The Supreme Court also narrowed the scope of the
29. Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 99CIV0793RCC, 2005 WL 500377, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2005).
30. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 276.
31. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 277; see also OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int'l., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d
357, 369-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 CIV. 926 (CSH),
1999 WL 47239, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999).
35. MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 280.
36. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985).
37. See Holmes v. SIP Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266-69 (1992); see also Anza v. Ideal Steel
Supply, 547 U.S. 451, 458-62 (2006).
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statute by adopting a strict textual analysis of civil liability under RICO.38
In this respect, it seems clear that the Second Circuit's holding in this case
was consistent with the narrowing trend of the RICO statute pursued by
the Supreme Court.
However, when Central Bank prohibited aiding and abetting claims
under the Securities and Exchange Act, plaintiffs were forced to turn to
RICO as their last hope of relief when claiming conspiracies to violate
securities laws, and several courts obliged. 39 Therefore, by completely
removing any conduct relating to the sale or purchase of securities as
predicate acts under RICO, the Second Circuit knowingly eliminated this
entire class of possible plaintiffs and unjustly left them without valid re-
course against those profiting from fraudulent securities conspiracy.
In the current case, while the Second Circuit held the language added
to the RICO statute by the PSLRA unambiguously bars plaintiffs from
making civil RICO claims predicated on securities fraud, 40 it failed to
fully explore the ambiguity stemming from the word "actionable." At
first glance, it seems clear that because MLSMK had no alternative cause
of action under existing securities laws, due to the bar on aiding and abet-
ting claims, it was not relying on conduct that was at all "actionable as
fraud" under securities laws; thus, MLSMK should have avoided the
breadth of the RICO amendment. 4 1 Although consistent with the Su-
preme Court's trend of narrowing the scope of predicate acts brought
under RICO, the court clearly overstated the alleged clarity of the stat-
ute's wording. Further, because at least two district courts had relied on
the term actionable in determining that an aiding and abetting securities
fraud claim escaped the RICO amendment, 42 the language at issue obvi-
ously is not as plainly "unambiguous" as the court found.
Nevertheless, while the court ultimately continued on to note the
amendment's legislative history for support,43 it glossed over even more
potential ambiguity found throughout the Senate Report of the PSLRA.
The report clearly noted that there was a growing amount of frivolous
litigation under federal securities laws, much of which was in an attempt
to abuse corporate reputations at the "cost of raising capital." 4 Moreo-
ver, the report explicitly states that the PSLRA aims "to encourage plain-
tiffs' lawyers to pursue valid claims," and that the legislation is expected
to continue "'to provide the highest level of protection to investors in our
capital markets." 45 Here, it is very difficult to see how MLSMK's com-
plaint against JPMC falls outside of the scope of this alleged "protection
38. See generally Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1992).
39. See OSRecovery, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 368; see also Renner, 1999 WL 47239, at *6-7.
40. See MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 278.
41. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2010).
42. See OSRecovery, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 368-70; see also Renner, 1999 WL 47239, at
*6-7.
43. See MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 278.
44. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
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to investors." The court here clearly ignored the general theme underly-
ing the amendment: to deter and bar meritless claims. It is clear that
MLSMK's claim against JPMC was meritorious: JPMC continued to col-
lect fees, to provide services to, and to benefit from the business of BMIS,
which after investigation JPMC knew was fraudulently scheming inves-
tors out of their money. Interpreting the PSLRA to bar exactly what it
claims to encourage is counter-intuitive. Moreover, as the court acknowl-
edged, not only does this ruling bar MLSMK from bringing this claim, it
essentially leaves them without any claim against JPMC.46 The court it-
self recognized that the core purpose behind enacting the bar "was to
prevent litigants from using artful pleading to boot-strap securities fraud
cases into RICO cases, with their threat of treble damages. '47 It is clear
that because investors like MLSMK have no alternative securities fraud
claim, there is simply no "boot-strapping" of which they might take ad-
vantage, and as consequent, they are unjustly left without any private
cause of action against a party who clearly benefitted at its customers'
expense.
In the end, the Second Circuit solely focused on the particular provi-
sion of the committee reports which does show Congress's specific intent
to bar all securities-related conduct as predicate acts for RICO claims:
"The Committee intends this amendment to eliminate securities fraud as
a predicate act of racketeering in a civil RICO action. ' 48 However, the
misalignment of these isolated intentions within the overall theme of pro-
moting meritorious claims present throughout the legislative history of
the PSLRA is quite troubling when victims such as MLSMK are left with-
out private recourse. JPMC clearly benefitted from the corrupt business
dealings of Madoff and BMIS, but MLSMK is barred from taking direct
private action. While the court and the legislative history acknowledge
the fact that some will be left without a course of action against aiders
and abettors of securities fraud, the additional views of Senators
Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer included within the Senate Report shed light
on some of their relevant concerns: "We support efforts to deter frivolous
securities lawsuits, but .... [this amendment] erodes the ability of inves-
tors to seek recovery in cases of fraud."' 49 The Senators believed that in
order to strengthen the proper balance between deterring frivolous
claims and encouraging meritorious ones, the bill should have at least
restored the aiding and abetting of securities fraud liability that Central
Bank previously barred.50 In such a case, victims such as MLSMK would
be entitled to bring their complaints under securities law without having
to resort to RICO at all.
46. See MLSMK, 651 F.3d at 280.
47. Id. at 274.
48. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19.
49. Id. at 49.




In conclusion, while the language of the statute itself was not at all as
unambiguous as the Second Circuit made it seem, the specific provisions
found within the legislative history of the act are supportive of the court's
conclusion. Additionally, the court's decision is supported by the general
trend in narrowing the civil scope of the RICO statute. However, the
court clearly failed to acknowledge the bigger picture behind the amend-
ment: to deter meritless claims. Moreover, as the dissenting senators
pointed out in the Senate Report, leaving securities fraud victims without
any private right of action should not be a repercussion of the Act.51 Ac-
cording to Senator Dodd, while important to deter meritless claims, "we
must do all that we can to ensure that legitimate victims can continue to
sue and can recover damages quickly."'52 While leaving aiders and abet-
tors of securities fraud immune from private causes of action may reduce
the amount of frivolous, deep-pocket-seeking lawsuits, it clearly pushes
the line too far by incentivizing companies such as JPMC to reap the
benefits of other's fraudulent investment activities at the detriment of in-
nocent investors like MLSMK.
51. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 51.
52. Id.
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